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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BRUCE LABEAU, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 940231-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is established 
by 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Judgment, Sentence, and 
Commitment from the Fifth District Court for Iron County following 
a conviction of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon, a Third-Degree 
Felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This appeal is prosecuted under the specific requests of 
the Defendant after his counsel, the author of this Brief has 
instructed the Defendant-Appellant that, in his opinion, the case 
does not contain sufficient cause to prosecute an appeal. However, 
the undersigned has been instructed by his client to pursue the 
appeal. Under these circumstances, the undersigned is submitting 
an "Anders" brief. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The 
potential issues for review of the court are the fact that two of 
the empaneled jurors were challenged for cause because of their 
employment or other relationship with law enforcement authorities 
of the State of Utah and for failure to dismiss the information at 
the conclusion of the State's case because "dangerous weapon" was 
adequately defined in the statute. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
The statute which is believed to be determinative in this 
matter are Sections 76-8-311.3 and 76-1-601, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. These statutes are reproduced in total in the 
Addendum to this brief. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Judgment, Sentence and 
Commitment for the offense of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon, a 
Third-Degree Felony from the Fifth District Court of Iron County, 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was originally charged with Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon and Possession of a Spirituous or Fermented Liquid 
by a Prisoner. The latter charge was dismissed before trial, but 
the remaining charge went to trial before a jury on February 17, 
1994. At the conclusion of the State's case, Defendant moved for 
dismissal on the grounds that dangerous weapon was not adequately 
defined under Section 76-8-311.3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. The court denied the motion and at the conclusion of all 
of the evidence, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty against 
Defendant. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
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At the trial court the Defendant was convicted of 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon, a Third-Degree Felony, and 
sentenced to zero to five years of incarceration at the Utah State 
Prison to be served following a present sentence that he is 
serving. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During he course of jury selection, one potential juror 
stated that she was an employee of the State of Utah, Department 
of Youth Corrections. Similarly, another potential juror stated 
that her daughter was an Assistant Attorney General for the State 
of Utah. Defendant challenged both jurors for cause, but the lower 
court denied the challenge. Nevertheless, the State executed two 
of its own peremptory challenges to cause both potential jurors to 
be excluded. (Tr. 65-66). 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, Defendant made 
a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Section 76-8-311.3, does 
not have a definition of "dangerous weapon". The evidence that 
developed to that point showed that Defendant was allegedly in 
possession of a "shank" which appeared to be an approximately four-
inch long cylindrical piece of metal that had been partially 
sharpened. The lower court denied the motion on the ground that 
"dangerous weapon" was adequately defined under Section 76-1-601(5) 
of the Utah Code. (Tr. 135). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is believed that Defendant would contend that the two 
jurors should have been excused for cause because of their 
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relationship to law enforcement personnel. 
Also, Defendant would contest the constitutionality of 
Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 311.3 on the grounds that it does not 
properly define a dangerous weapon and is, therefore, void for 
vagueness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY 
FAILED TO EXCUSE THE TWO JURORS FOR CAUSE 
Defendant would argue that the two jurors that he asked 
to be excused for cause should have been excused by the court 
pursuant to Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure* 
Specifically, Defendant would claim that one of the jurors was an 
employee of a correction agency of the State of Utah and that the 
other juror was a parent of an Assistant Attorney General, which 
is a prosecutorial agency. 
Counsel for Defendant believes that the above argument 
is flawed because even if the court improperly failed to remove 
the questioned jurors for cause, they were removed, in any event, 
by the State1s peremptory challenges. Accordingly, the error, if 
any, was harmless error. Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). See State v. 
Featherson, 71 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
1071 (Utah 1989). 
Since both jurors were excused through peremptory 
challenges, and Defendant did not have to use his own peremptory 
challenges to accomplish the same, the outcome obviously would have 
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been no different had the court excused the jurors for cause. 
Indeed, had the court excused the jurors for cause, the State could 
have used two of its peremptory challenges on other jurors that may 
have been more favorable to Defendant. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HE WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW BECAUSE THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH 
HE WAS CONVICTED WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
Defendant would argue to the court that the definition 
of "dangerous weapon" is not stated in Section 76-8-311.3, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and therefore, whether he has 
committed an offense is ambiguous and unconstitutionally vague. 
There is no definition of "dangerous weapon" in the 
statute under which Defendant has been charged. Accordingly, 
Defendant would argue that it would be impossible for him to 
ascertain whether the production of the "shank" and his possession 
of it would be a criminal offenses under the law. Therefore, he 
would argue that the Information against him should have been 
dismissed. 
Counsel believes that even though "dangerous weapon" is 
not defined under the statute for which Defendant has been charged, 
it has been clearly defined under Section 76-1-601(5) of the Utah 
x 
Code. That Section states that the definition applies throughout 
the criminal code. Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-601 (1992). The 
"shank" would easily be determined by reasonable jurors as "capable 
of causing death or serious bodily injury" and that Defendant's 
"intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe 
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the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury". 
Serious bodily injury is also clearly defined under Section 76-1-
601. Id., Subsection (10). 
It is difficult to conceive of a purpose for a "shank" 
within a prison population that would not contemplate causing 
"serious bodily injury". Accordingly, it would have been 
reasonable for the jury, having the definitions of "dangerous 
weapon" and "serious bodily injury", to conclude that the "shank" 
was a dangerous weapon under the statute under which Defendant was 
charged. Moreover, it is patently reasonable to presume that 
Defendant, being charged with the definitions of "dangerous weapon" 
and "serious bodily injury" would likewise know that the "shank" 
was a dangerous weapon within the contemplation of 76-8-311.3. 
Therefore, any claim of "void for vagueness" is, at best, 
frivolous. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests the court to consider the 
issues he believes to be relevant and award such relief as it deems 
appropriate. 
DATED this ~>V— day of September, 1994. 
M^-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a two (2) true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Ms. Jan 
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HOLM 
Graham, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, and to Bruce LaBeau, P.O. Box 550, Gunnison, 
UT 84634, this 3* 
day of September, 1994, first class postage 
fully prepaid. 
HOLM 
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A D D E N D U M 
76-8-311.3. Items prohibited in correctional fa-
cilities — Penalties. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Controlled substance" means any sub-
stance defined as a controlled substance under 
Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances 
Act. 
(b) "Correctional facility" means: 
(i) any facility operated by the Depart-
ment of Corrections to house offenders in ei-
ther a secure or nonsecure setting; 
(ii) any facility operated by a municipality 
or a county to house or detain criminal of-
fenders; and 
(iii) any building or grounds appurtenant 
to the facility or lands granted to the state, 
municipality, or county for use as a correc-
tional facility. 
(c) "Offender" means a person confined at a 
correctional facility. 
(d) "Medicine" means any prescription drug as 
defined in Title 58, Chapter 17, Pharmacy Prac-
tice Act, but does not include any controlled sub-
stances as defined in Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah 
Controlled Substances Act. 
(2) Except as provided by correctional facility pol-
icy or rule, no firearm, ammunition, dangerous 
weapon, implement of escape, explosive, controlled 
substance, spirituous or fermented liquor, medicine, 
or poison in any quantity may be-
(a) transported to or upon a correctional facil-
ity; 
(b) sold or given away at any correctional facil-
ity; or 
(c) given to or used by any offender at a correc-
tional facility. 
(3) It is a defense to any prosecution under this 
section if the accused in committing the act made 
criminal hereby: 
(a) with respect to a correctional facility oper-
ated by the Department of Corrections, acted in 
conformity with departmental rule or policy; 
(b) with respect to a correctional facility oper-
ated by a municipality, acted in conformity with 
the policy of the municipality; or 
(c) with respect to a correctional facility oper-
ated by a county, acted in conformity with the 
policy of the county. 
(4) (a) Any person who transports to or upon a cor-
rectional facility any firearm, ammunition, dan-
gerous weapon, explosive, or implement of escape 
with intent to provide or sell it to any offender, is 
guilty of a second degree felony. 
(b) Any person who provides or sells to any 
offender at a correctional facility any firearm, 
ammunition, dangerous weapon, explosive, or 
implement of escape is guilty of a second degree 
felony. 
(c) Any offender who possesses at a correc-
tional facility any firearm, ammunition, danger-
ous weapon, explosive, or implement of escape is 
guilty of a second degree felony. 
(d) Any person who, without the permission of 
the authority operating the correctional facility, 
knowingly possesses at a correctional facility any 
firearm, ammunition, dangerous weapon, imple-
ment of escape, or explosive is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(5) (a) Any person is guilty of a third degree felony 
who, without the permission of the authority op-
erating the correctional facility, knowingly 
transports to or upon a correctional facility any: 
(i) spirituous or fermented liquor; 
(ii) medicine, whether or not lawfully pre-
scribed for the offender; or 
(iii) poison in any quantity. 
(b) Any person is guilty of a third degree fel-
ony who knowingly violates correctional facility 
policy or rule by providing or selling to any of-
fender at a correctional facility any: 
(i) spirituous or fermented liquor; 
(ii) medicine, whether or not lawfully pre-
scribed for the offender; or 
(iii) poison in any quantity. 
(c) Any offender is guilty of a third degree fel-
ony who, in violation of correctional facility pol-
icy or rule, possesses at a correctional facility 
any: 
(i) spirituous or fermented liquor; 
(ii) medicine, other than medicine pro-
vided by the facility's health care providers 
in compliance with facility policy; or 
(iii) poison in any quantity. 
(d) Any person is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor who, without the permission of the au-
thority operating the correctional facility, fails to 
declare or knowingly possesses at a correctional 
facility any: 
(i) spirituous or fermented liquor; 
{\i) medicine; OT 
(iii) poison in any quantity. 
(6) The possession, distribution, or use of a con-
trolled substance at a correctional facility shall be 
prosecuted in accordance with Title 58, Chapter 37, 
Utah Controlled Substances Act. 1994 
PART 6 
DEFINITIONS 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms ap-
ply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement 
and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal re-
sponsibility is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, ill-
ness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capa-
ble of causing death or serious bodily injury, or a 
facsimile or representation of the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended 
use of the item leads the victim to reason-
ably believe the item is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he is in 
control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal 
statute of this state 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when 
there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capa-
ble of acting 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or 
private corporation, government, partnership, or 
unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical posses-
sion of or to exercise dominion or control over 
tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily in-
jury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 1989 
